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ARGUMENT 
A, LIEN FORECLOSURE IS NOT AVAILABLE TO COLLECT 
FEES AND INTEREST. 
The central issue in this dispute is whether or not the Association can avail itself of the 
remedy of foreclosure to collect interest and fees it claims to be entitled to. Mr. Bennion's 
position is clear: the Utah Code does not provide such a remedy. According to Condominium 
Ownership Act, if a condominium owner fails to pay an assessment of common expenses, the 
amount of common expenses which is unpaid constitutes a lien. Accordingly, the lien for 
"nonpayment of common expenses may be enforced by sale or foreclosure of the unit owner's 
interest by the manager or management committee." Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-20 (emphasis 
added). The collection of fees and interest does not appear in this or any other section of the 
Act because they do not constitute common expenses. Therefore, the present action should have 
been dismissed by the lower court as it has no basis in law. 
1. Late fees and interest penalties are not common to all unit owners. 
The Association argues that fees and interest should be considered assessments, even 
though they are not denominated as such, and should be classified as business expenses like taxes 
and maintenance charges. The argument is basically that since taxes and maintenance charges 
don't have to be separately assessed in order to be collected, neither do interest penalties and 
fees. A quick glance at the annual budget reveals the folly of this argument. Taxes and 
maintenance fees are expenses which must be paid, proportionally, by each unit owner. In order 
to properly effectuate this collection process, the Association assesses each owner his or her 
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proportional share, to be paid each month. Mr. Bennion has never missed one of these 
assessments. On the other hand, while fees and interest are included in the budget as an income 
item,1 they are not proportionally assessed to each individual unit owner. Indeed, it would not 
be proper, or legal, to assess a late fee to a unit owner who was not late in making payment. 
Instead, these fees and interest penalties, rather than being assessed by the Association, are 
charged when they are incurred, if at all. This is the distinction Mr. Bennion points out to the 
Court. According to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 149 (4th ed. 1968), "assess" means to 
"ascertain, adjust, and settle the respective shares to be contributed by several persons toward 
an object beneficial to them all, in proportion to the benefit received." Late fees and interest 
cannot be assessments because, until a specific unit owner is late, the fee has not been charged. 
2. Late fees and interest penalties are not expenses. 
Proof that late fees and interest penalties are not expenses is found in the annual budget 
prepared by the Association. 000048. Under the heading of "REVENUE" is the entry "Interest 
and other Late fees." Notably, the fees and interest category is listed separately from the 
"Assessments" category in the budget. Further down the document, under the heading of 
"EXPENDITURES," are the common expenses which are divided proportionally to be paid by 
the unit owners. This group includes, among other items, "Repairs and maintenance," "Payroll 
1
 The Association's statement that Mr. Bennion disputes that fees and interest are part of 
the budget is untrue, evidenced by the conspicuous absence of any citation to Mr, Bennion's 
brief supporting such a statement. Mr. Bennion did, however, point out the incorrectness of 
Appellees claim that taxes and maintenance costs are not individually assessed by showing the 
Court that these charges are separately delineated in the annual budget. See Appellant's Brief, 
p. 9. 
lbh\v-i\parkstn\repiy brf 2 7/27/95 
taxes" and "Insurance and taxes". Apparently the Association itself classifies late fees and 
interest as revenue, not as expenses. Because late fees and interest are neither common, see 
supra, nor expenses, they are not of the sort contemplated under the Act for collection by 
foreclosure. 
B. THE DECLARATION CANNOT PROVIDE MORE RIGHTS 
TO THE ASSOCIATION THAN UTAH LAW PROVIDES. 
As explained above, the Act allows for foreclosure to collect amounts which have been 
assessed for common expenses. The Association, in this action, is attempting to avail itself of 
the foreclosure provided for in the Act to collect money which is not an assessment for common 
expenses, but rather a revenue item. The Association looks to Article 9.04 of the Declaration 
for support of this action, but because this Article bestows greater power on the Association than 
that given by statute, it must be stricken. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-10(2)(d)(v). In other 
words, because the law does not provide for foreclosure for fees and interest, the Declaration 
cannot supersede the law and provide a remedy where none exists. The Utah Legislature has 
occupied the field in the area of condominium law and there is no room for private 
determination of rights. 
The Association offers the Court the argument that Mr. Bennion is somehow trying to 
use the Declaration to interpret the Act. See Appellees' Brief, p. 12. The Association states: 
'The Appellant's rationale for using the Declaration to clarify terms in the Utah Code is unclear 
and faulty. Bennion offers no justification for using a private agreement as an aid for statutory 
interpretation." Id. Mr. Bennion offers no justification because he has not attempted to use the 
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Declaration in such a manner. On the contrary, Mr. Bennion asserts that the Act preempts any 
private determination of rights and responsibilities on the part of the Association. In his Brief, 
Mr. Bennion cites Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-20 and then makes the following statement: 
The only support for the Association's attempt at foreclosure for these amounts 
is found in Article 9.04 of the Declaration. That provision provides that "[a]ll 
sums" may be the subject of a lien. 000013-14. Nothing in the Declaration 
provides for foreclosure for late fees and interest. Notwithstanding, the 
Declaration could never provide a remedy for the Association which is not 
supplied by law. Declarations as a matter of law must be "consistent with" the 
Condominium Ownership Act. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 10 (italics in original, underline added). Hence, the Association's 
argument—that Mr. Bennion's use of the Declaration to aid in statutory interpretation means that 
he implicitly accepts the legality of collection by foreclosure—is fatally flawed. See Appellees' 
Brief, p. 12. In fact, Mr. Bennion argues the exact opposite; the inclusion of late fees and 
interest in Article 9 of the Declaration causes that provision to go beyond the power granted the 
Association under the Act and it should be removed or altered, deleting the illegal authority to 
collect these sums by foreclosure. 
The Association claims that if the Court were to rule in favor of Mr. Bennion it would 
make the due date on payments of assessments meaningless. See Appellees' Brief, p. 13. The 
Association fears that without the drastic measure of foreclosure available for failure to pay late 
fees, no unit owner would pay the monthly assessments on time and the Association would 
experience a cash flow problem. Id. This, however, is an extreme reaction to a non-existent 
problem. The Association, as pointed out in Appellant's Brief, has, and always will have, the 
remedy of collection. For example, if a person bounces a check at a store, the store can 
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institute collection proceedings to recover the money owed. If the person pays the amount of 
the check but refuses to pay an NSF (non-sufficient funds) charge, the store can recover this 
amount in a collection action as well. Mr. Bennion is simply asserting that an action to 
foreclose on his property is a far too drastic a remedy to be available for such a trivial matter 
as late fees and interest.2 
The Association responds that it "is under no obligation to pursue a remedy which would 
be more amenable to [Mr.] Bennion/' Appellees' Brief, p. 15. Further, the Association states 
that "[cjourts in other jurisdictions have had no reservation enforcing liens on condominiums for 
Late Fees and Interest." Id. at 13/ As support, the Association cites Halpern v. Paolini, 1992 
W.L. 14095 (Mass. App. 1992). This case, however, contrary to the Association's hopes, 
offers no support as it is distinguishable on its facts. In Halpern, a lien was enforced against 
the defendant's condominium "for unpaid common area fees and expenses and related late 
charges." Id. at 1 (emphasis added). The instant action is an attempt to foreclose for "related 
late charges" only. This distinction is of such importance as to make Halpern totally without 
merit as applied to this case. 
2
 Apparently the Utah Legislature agrees as evidenced by the absence of a provision for the 
collection of late fees and interest in the Act. 
3
 The Association cites, however, only one such court. The failure to provide additional 
support suggests that this position is not as strong as The Associatoin suggests, especially in light 
of the unpublished nature of the cited case. 
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C. MR. BENNION DID NOT FAIL TO ADDRESS POINTS 
ONE AND TWO OF HIS STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES. 
The Association argues that because Mr. Bennion outlined two issues for appeal but then 
subsequently failed to address them in his argument, the Court should ignore these issues. 
However, Mr. Bennion has briefed and argued each point presented in his statement of the 
issues. 
1. Issue 1: Whether the ttial court correctly concluded that no serous issue of 
material fact existed to preclude summary judgement as to Appellant's assertion 
that the Declaration did not apply to him. 
Contrary to the Association's assertion that Mr. Bennion did not brief this issue, it was 
included in Mr. Bennion's Summary of the Argument. Simply because Mr. Bennion chose not 
to more fully argue the issue does not lead to the conclusion that it is not relevant to his case 
or that the Court should now ignore it.4 However, the Association has provided no proof that 
Mr. Bennion agreed to be bound to the Declaration, including the payment of late fees and 
interest penalties. Mr. Bennion disputes paragraph 3 of the Association's Statement of Facts as 
inaccurate and misleading. See Appellee's Brief, p. 4. The trial court, on this issue alone, 
should have allowed the case to be presented to a fact finder, as it is certainly material. 
4
 We can be assured that if Mr. Bennion had made a statement in his Summary which 
strenghtened the Association's position, it would not now be asking the Court to disregard it. 
lbh\v-l\parkstn\repiy brf 6 7/27/95 
2. Issue 2: Whether the Trial Court correctly concluded that no genuine issue of 
material fact existed regarding whether other resolution, documents, contracts, 
minutes or policies altered the wording of the Declaration. 
Likewise, Mr. Bennion did not fail to brief this issue in his initial Brief. Concededly, 
no heading which would point distinctly to this issue was used, but the issue was argued 
nonetheless. Mr. Bennion argued that the trial court's decision that his unit dues were late was 
erroneous. He based this argument on the fact that the Declaration provided a 15 day grace 
period in which payments could be made to the Association. Additionally, each of Mr. 
Bennion's monthly payments went to pay the principal of his assessment, with no money 
deducted to pay the claimed interest and late fees. The 15 day grace period, and the 
Association's course of conduct, led Mr. Bennion to believe that the Declaration had been 
modified and that the fees and interest which were booked were not being, and would not be, 
collected by the Association. In other words, Mr. Bennion believed that the policies 
implemented by the Association had altered the wording of the Declaration. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Associations because 
genuine issues of material fact are present in this case. Additionally, under the standard of 
review, the lower court's interpretation of the Condominium Ownership Act and the Declaration 
should be declared erroneous. Therefore, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the summary judgment entered by the Circuit Court. 
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